Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
1987

Eyewitness Identifications and Expert Testimony
Paul C. Giannelli

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Repository Citation
Giannelli, Paul C., "Eyewitness Identifications and Expert Testimony" (1987). Faculty Publications. 405.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/405

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

I
Winter 1987

Vol. 10, No. 1

Ff1h;Aii/9B
~- f .h {;1

EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY Paul C. Giannelli

·V

Professor of law
Case Western Reserve University
Both courts and commentators have noted the problems of eyewitness identifications. In United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967), the Supreme Court
commented: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with
instances of mistaken identification." LaFave and Israel
provide the following account:
A dramatic example of the dangers inherent in
accepting the identification testimony even of several
eyewitnesses in the absence of corroborative
evidence is the case of Adolph Beck. Mistakenly identified by twenty-two witnesses, Beck served seven
years in prison tor crimes he did not commit. Subsequently, a committee formed to investigate the case
concluded that "evidence as to identity based on
personal impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps
of all classes of evidence the least to be relied upon,
and therefore, unless supported by other facts, an
unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury." More recently,
seven eyewitnesses swore that Bernard T. Pagano
was the man who politely pointed a small, chromeplated pistol at them and demanded their money.
Fortunately, midway through the trial of the Roman
Catholic priest, Ronald Clouser admitted that he, not
Father Pagano, had committed the six armed robberies. 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 549
(1984).
A substantial amount of psychological research also
supports the proposition that eyewitness identifications
are often problematic. See Evaluating Witness Evidence:
Recent Psychological Research and New Perspectives
(S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford eds. 1983); B. Clifford & R.
Bull, Psychology of Person Identification (1978); E.
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); A. Yarmey, Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (G. Wells & E. Loftus eds.
1984); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Crimina/Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1079 (1973).
Psychological research on eyewitness identification
dates back to the turn of the century. See H. Munsterberg, On the Witness Stand: Essays on Psychology and
Crime (1908). It is estimated, however, that "over 85% of
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the entire published literature has surfaced since 1978."
Wells & Loftus, Eyewitness Research: Then and Now, in
Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives 1, 3
(G. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984). This research emphasizes the complex nature of human perception and
memory. Human perception and memory do not function
like a videotape recorder, accurately recording all images
which can subsequently be retrieved fully. Rather, it is a
constructive process, in which many factors play a part.

Perception
The perception and memory process can be divided
into three stages. The first is the acquisition stage, during
which the event is perceived and entered in the memory.
The second is the retention stage -the time between
the event and its recollection. The third stage is theretrieval stage during which the information relating to the
event is recalled. E. Loftus, supra, at 21.1naccuracies
can be introduced at all three stages. A number of factors
influence accuracy during the acquisition stage. The literature indicates that witnesses are more accurate when:
(1) exposure time is longer rather than shorter, (2) events
are less rather than more violent, (3) witnesses are not
subject to extreme stress, (4) witnesses are tree from
biased expectations, (5) witnesses are young adults rather than children, and (6) witnesses are asked to report on
salient aspects of an event rather than peripheral aspects.
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Research
and Legal Thought, in 3 Crime and Justice: An Annual
Review of Research 105, 115-16 (M. Tonry & N. Morris
eds. 1981).

Memory
Studies of the retention of information indicate that two
factors influence the accuracy of the memory during the
retention stage. First, the longer the interval between the
event and the recollection of the event, the greater the
lapse in memory. However, the lapse in memory does not
decrease at a uniform rate; it decreases sharply immediately after the event and then more slowly over a period
of time. E. Loftus, supra at 53. Second, new information
enters the memory between the event and its recollection: "External information provided from the outside can
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intrude into the witness's memory, as can his own.
thoughts, and both can cause dramatic changes in his
recollection." /d. at 87. Finally, the way in which information is retrieved can influence memory. For example, the
method of questioning, the type of identification procedure employed, the status of the questioner, and nonverbal communication clues all may distort memory. Loftus,
supra at 110. Facial recognition presents special problems, especially cross-racial identifications. Johnson,
Cross-Racial identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
Cornell L. Rev. 934, 938 (1984)("The impairment in ability
to recognize black faces is substantial."). Dr. Elizabeth
Loftus, a prominent researcher in this field, notes that
people "have greater difficulty in recognizing faces of
another race than faces of their own race. This crossracial identification problem is not due to the fact that
people have greater prejudices or less experience with
members of the other race." E. Loftus, supra at 139.

presence of counsel itself can. often avert prejudice
and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there
can be little doubt that ... [a post-indictment lineup
is] a critical stage of the prosecution ... 388 U.S. at
236-37.
The right to counsel offered perhaps the greatest
protection against erroneous eyewitness identifications
because the presence of counsel would discourage the
use of suggestive procedures by the police. In Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), however, the Court restricted
the right to counsel. Under Kirby, the right to counsel
attaches only after the "initiation of adversary judicial
crfmiiialprocelfditfgs .. ."/d. at 68R The "grave potential
for prejudice" cited in Wade is not diminished simply because judicial criminal proceedings have yet to commence. Thus, Kirby ignored the underlying rationale of
Wade, which is the need to protect the ability of the accused to confront effectively the eyewitnesses' identification at trial. Since most lineups are held before the commencement of judicial proceedings, the right to counsel
is now applicable only in a smallnumber of cases. See
generally 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure§
7.3 (1984); N. Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification: Legal
and Practical Problems § 2 (2d ed. 1983).

Jury Impact
The research reveals also that the impact of eyewitness identifications on juries is substantial. See Brigham
& Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 Law & Hum.
Behav. 19 (1983). In commenting on the research, Dr.
Loftus has written that eyewitness testimony "is likely to
be believed by jurors, especially when it is offered with a
high level of confidence, even though the accuracy of an
eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not
be related to one another at all." E. Loftus, supra at 19.
Indeed, two researchers have concluded that "the
eyewitness accuracy-confidence relationship is weak
under good laboratory conditions and functionally
useless in forensically representative settings." Wells &
Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, inEyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives 155, 165 (G. Wells & E.
Loftus eds. 1984).
·

Due Process
At the same time it decided Wade and Gilbert, the
Court also held that identification procedures implicate
the due process clause. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967). This development is important because a criminal
defendant's right to due process is more extensive than
his right to counsel; all identifications are subject to scrutiny under a due process analysis. Thus, identifications
made prior to the attachment ofthe right to counsel,
Kirby v.lllinois,.406.l).S. 682, 691 (1972); identifications
involving photographic displays, Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); and presumably, even identifications at which counsel is present, may be suppressed
as violative of due process.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The courts have taken several approaches to eyewitness identification testimony. One approach is based on
a constitutional analysis- the right to counsel and due
process.

The standard used by the Court in determining whether an identification comports with due process has undergone a substantial evolution since Stovall was decided. In Stovall, the due process test was whether the identification was"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification." 388 U.S. at 302.
The focus of this test is the reliability of the identification
procedure used by the police; if the procedure is both
suggestive and unnecessary, it offends due process.
Although the Court considered the issue in a number of
cases after Stovall, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), it was not until Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), that it became apparent that
the Stovall standard had been substantially diluted. The
new standard- whether a substantial likelihood of misidentification has occurred- focuses on the reliability of
the actual identification rather than on the reliability of
the identification procedure. In determining whether
there has been a substantial likelihood of misidentification the trial court must evaluate the "totality of the circumstances," including "the opportunity of the witness to
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness'
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior
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Prior to 1967 the reliability of eyewitness identifications
was primarily a jury issue. In that year, however, the
Supreme Court decided three cases that "constitutionalized" this area of criminal law. Two of the cases- United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967)- involved the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Because of the innumerable ways in
which identification procedures can affect the accuracy
of eyewitness identifications, the Court in Wade held that
a lineup is a "critical stage" of the criminal process,
thereby entitling the defendant to the assistance of counsel. The presence of counsel, according to the Court,
would assure that a defendant could effectively challenge a subsequent in-court identification based upon a
suggestive pretrial identification.
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which
may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since
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description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the
length of time between the crime and the confrontation."
!d. at 199-200.
The Court's most recent treatment of the subject, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), may have altered
again the due process test. After reaffirming Biggers and
referring to the factors cited in Biggers as relevant to the
totality of the circumstances test, the Court stated:
"Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting
effect of the suggestive identification itself." !d. at 114.
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, read this statement as a recognition of the continued validity of Stovall:
In assessing the reliability of the identification, the
Court mandates weighing "the corrupting effect of the
suggestive identification itself" against the indicators
of [a witness'] ability to make an accurate identification ... The Court holds, as Neil v. Biggers, failed to,
that a due process identification inquiry must take
account of the suggestiveness of a confrontation and
the likelihood that it led to misidentification, as recognized in Stovall and Wade. Thus, even if a witness did
have an otherwise adequate opportunity to view a
criminal, the later use of a highly suggestive identification procedure can render this testimony inadmissible.
!d. at 129.
See generally 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure§ 7.4 (1984); N. Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification:
Legal and Practical Problems§ 3 (2d ed. 1983).

Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity
to observe the offender at the time of the offense will
be affected by such matters as how long or short a
time was available, how far or close the witness was
how good were lighting conditions, whether the
'
witness had had occasion to see or know the person
in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he
makes on his perception through the use of his
senses.
Usually the witness identifies an offender by the
sense of sight- but this is not necessarily so, and he
may use other senses.]
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by
the witness subsequent to the offense was the product
of his own recollection? You may take into account
both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been
influenced by the circumstances under which the
defendant was presented to him for identification, you
should scrutinize the identification with great care. You
may also consider the length of time that lapsed
between the occurrence of the crime and the next
opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a
factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of
similar individuals is generally more reliable than one
which results from the presentation of the defendant
alone to the witness.]
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in
which the witness failed to make an identification of
defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent with his identification at trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each
identification witness in the same way as any other
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider
whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make
a reliable observation on the matter covered in his
testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the
prosecutor extends to every element of the crime
charged, and this specifically includes the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which
he stands charged. If after examining the testimony,
you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the
identification, you must find the defendant not guilty.
(Paragraphs in brackets are to be used only if appropriate.) !d. at 558-59.
The Te!faire court emphasized that a failure to use the
model instruction with appropriate adaptations "would
constitute a risk [of r!3versal] in future cases." /d. at 557.
Several federal courts have explicitly mandated the use
of this instruction or a substantial equivalent. See United
States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974).
Other federal courts have expressed their approval of the
instruction but leave the final decision on whether to give
the instruction to the discretion of the trial court. See
United States v. Scott; 578 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.), cert.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The dilution of the due process test and the restriction
of the right to cbunsel has undercut the constitutional
approach to the eyewitness identification problem. Accordingly, several other approaches have been proposed.
Some courts, in an attempt to minimize the dangers of
eyewitness identifications, have required cautionary instructions. In United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), the court proposed the following model instruction:
One of the most important issues in this case is the
·identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime. The Government has the burden of proving
identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is essential that
the witness himself be free from doubt as to the
correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury,
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
accuracy of the identification of the defendant before
you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person
who committed the crime, you must find the defendant
not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
impression by the witness. Its value depends on the
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at
the time of the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a
witness, you should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the
capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the
offender?
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denied1A-39US, £370{1978); United States v. Kavanagh,
572 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Dodge, 538
F.2~ .??,9.}84 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099
(1979); Unife(:fSlates v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976).
Several state courts also favor jury instructions. See
State v. Benjamin, 33 Conn. Supp. 586, 589, 363 A.2d
762, 764 (1976); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 397, 635
P.2d 1236, 1244 (1981); State v. Calia, 15 Or. App. 110,
114-15, 514 P.2d 1354, 1356 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
917 (1974); but see People v. Hefner, 70 Ill. App. 3d 693,
697, 388 N.E.2d-1059, 1062 (1979) (rejecting the use of
jury instrUctiohs):
In Ohio the use of the instruction is left to the discretion
of the trial judge. See State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 266,
272, 421N:E2d 157; 161 (1981); State v. Caldwell, 19
Ohio App: 3d 104, 107, 483 N.E.2d 187, 191 (1984); State
v. Dale, 3 Ohio App. 3d 431,434-35,445 N.E.2d 1137,
ii40•41 (1982) (finding an abuse of discretion in the trial
court's refusal to give an instruction). See generally Note,
Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for
Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 Wash.
U.L.Q. 1387 (1983); Annot., 23 A.L.R.4th 1089 (1983).
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v. Dodson, 16 M.J. 921, 930(N.C.M.R.1983), modified, 21
M.J. 237 (C. M.A. 1986); United States v. Hicks, 7 M.J.
561, 566 (A.C.M.R. 1979). See also Rodriguez v. Wainwright, 740 F.2d 884, 885 (11th Cir. 1984)(no constitutional vio!ation i_ndexclfusion of experdt testimony onS
.~
eyew1tness 1 enti ication), cert. enied, 469 U.. 1113
(1985).
Similarly, a substantial majority of state courts have
upheld the exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness
identifications. See Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 370-71,
642 S.W.2d 865, 872 (1982); Dyas v. United States, 376
A.2d 827, 831-32 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977);
Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1051(1984); State v. Hoisington, 104
Idaho 153, 165, 657 P.2d 17, 29 (1983); People v. Dixon, 87
Ill. App. 3d 814, 818, 410 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1980); State v.
Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 741-42 (Iowa 1979); State v.
Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981);
State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 944-45 (La. 1982); State
v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194, 197 (Me. 1979); Commonw~alth
v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 101,453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210
(1983); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545,547 (Minn.
1980); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 147-48, 576 P.2d 275,
278-79 (1978); State v. Sims, 3 Ohio App. 3d 321, 324-26,
445 N.E.2d 235, 240-41 (1981); State v. Porraro, 121 R.I.
882, 892-93, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (1979); State v. Wooden,
658 S.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1983); State v.
Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 104-05, 453 A.2d 393, 395-96 (1982);
State v. Barry, 25 Wash. App. 751, 760-61, 611 P.2d 1262,
1267 (1980); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 461, 285
N.W.2d 868, 873 (1979).

EXPERT TESTIMONY
In c;tddition to the constitutional and jury instructions
issues, some commentators have advocated the use of
expert testimony concerning the problems of eyewitness
identifications. One of the first writers to propose this
solution wrote:
[The] presentation to the trier of fact of expert psychological testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony"provides·the proper safeguard for the problems identification evidence poses.
The expert witness can relate-the findings of numerous studies and experiments that psychologists have
conducted to test the general reliability of eyewitness
identification and can analyze the various cognitive
and social factors that may have affected the accuracy
of the particular identification in the case at hand ...
[S]uch expert psychological testimony can respond to
the particular facts of a case and, more importantly,
can furnish the jurors with the scientific information
needed for a full and proper evaluation of the identification evidence. Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyew_itnessldentification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969,
1006-07(1977).
Until recently, however, the overwhelming majority of
courts were not receptive to expert testimony concerning
the identification process. Most federal courts have
upheld a trial court's decision to exclude such testimony.
See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2679 (1985); United
Stat.es v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590
F.2d 381,383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 540
F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1100 (1977); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150
(9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom, United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United States v.
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); United States

Various rationales have been offered to support this
,
result. First, some courts have held that expert testimony \
on this subject is unnecessary, or at least not helpful,
because the jury is capable of evaluating defiCiencies in
eyewitness testimony. According to these courts, "effective cross-examination is adequate to reveal any inconsistencies or deficiencies in the eye-witness testimony."
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.
1973). Second, there has been some concern about the
scientific basis for such testimony. One court found that
the work in the field "still remains inadequate to justify its
admission into evidence." United States v. Watson, 587
F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979). Third, there is a concern that expert testimony on
this issue will"invade the province of the jury." United
States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds sub. nom, United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225 (1975). Fourth, some courts have excluded
expert testimony because it would entail a time-consuming "battle of experts" that may confuse the jury. United
States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383-84 (1st Cir. 1979).
Several recent cases, however, have adopted a more
receptive attitude to expert testimony conceming the
problems of eyewitness identifications. In particular,
these courts have questioned the principal obstacle to
admissibility- the view that eyewitness identification
problems are readily understood by juries and therefore
expert testimony is neither necessary nor helpful.
State v. Chapple
In State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208
(1983), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the exclu-

'!

'•
,1,

Iii\•

4

1224 (3d Cir. 1985). Agreeing with the state courts in
Chapple and McDonald, the Third Circuit held that
"under certain circumstances expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identifications can assist the jury
in reaching a correct decision and therefore may meet
the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702." /d. at 1231.
See also United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984).
The court, however, remanded the case to the district
court to determine the issue. On remand, the trial court
excluded the evidence. United States v. Downing, 609 F.
Supp. 784 (E. D. Pa. 1985).

sion of expert testimony under the facts of that case was
an abuse of discretion:
Even assuming that jurors of ordinary education need
no expert testimony to enlighten them to the danger of
eyewitness identification, the offer of proof indicated
that Dr. Loftus' testimony would have informed the jury
that there are many specific variables which affect the
accuracy of identification and which apply to the facts
of this case. /d. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220.
First, the expert would have testified that the "curve of
forgetting" is not uniform; forgetting occurs very quickly
and then tends to level off. Thus, an immediate identification is far more reliable thana long~delayed identification. Second, whereas most laymen believe that stress
causes people to remember better, the experimental
research indicates that stress causes the opposite effect.
Third, there is the problem of "unconscious transfer."
This involves a situation where the witness fails to make
a photographic identification and then later sees the
same face in a subsequent photo display. The eyewitness may associate the face with the crime instead of the
prior photo display. Fourth, the assimilation of post-event
information, such as the feedback of another eyewitness,
may taint the identification. Finally, the research data
indicates that there is no relationship between the confidence of a witness in making an identification and the
accuracy of that identification. /d. at 292-94, 660 P.2d
1220-21.

United States v. Moore
Following the trend of the recent cases, the Fifth Circuit also has altered its position on the admissibility of
expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifications.
In United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986),
the court commented:
Expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is not
simply a recitation of facts available through common
knowledge. Indeed, the conclusions of the psychological studies are largely counter-intuitive ... For example, it is commonly believed that the accuracy of a
witness' recollection increases with the certainty of
the witness. In fact, the data reveal no correlation
between witness certainty and accuracy.
Similarly, it is commonly believed that witnesses
remember better when they are under stress. The data
indicate that the opposite is true. The studies also
show that a group consensus among witnesses as to
an alleged criminal's identity is far more likely to be
inaccurate than is an individual identification. This is
because of the effect of the "feedback factor," which
serves to reinforce mistaken identifications. We therefore recognize that the admission of this type of testimony is proper, at least in some cases.ld. at 1312.
Although the court went on to uphold the exclusion of
expert testimony in the case under review, it again highlighted its change in attitude: "We emphasize that in a
case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness
identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of
that identification is admissible and properly may be
encouraged." /d. at 1313.

People v. McDonald
The California Supreme Court also has held that
expert testimony may be proper: "We conclude that
although jurors may not be totally unaware of the ...
psychological factors bearing on eyewitness identification, the body of information now available on these
matters is 'sufficiently beyond common experience' that
in appropriate cases expert opinion thereon could at
least 'assist the trier of fact."' People v. McDonald, 37
Cal. 3d 351, 369, 690 P.2d 709, 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236,
248 (1984). In particular, the dangers of cross-racial identifications played an important role in the court's analysis. The expert could have testified that laboratory
experiments indicated that own-race/other-race recognition rates differed by as much as 30 percent.
The studies also reveal two aspects of the matter that
will probably be contrary to most jurors' intuitions:
first, that white witnesses who are not racially prejudiced are just as likely to be mistaken in making a
cross-racial identification as those who are prejudiced;
and second, that white witnesses who have had
considerable social contact with blacks may be no
better at identifying them than those who have not ...
Finally, some jurors may deny the existence of the
own-race effect in the misguided belief that it is merely
a racist myth exemplified by the derogatory remark,
"they all look alike to me," while others may believe in
the reality of this effect but be reluctant to discuss it in
deliberations for fear of being seen as bigots. /d. at
368, 690 P.2d at 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 248.

State v. Buell
In State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124,489 N.E.2d 795
(1986), the Ohio Supreme Court also recognized the
admissibility of expert testimony. Relying on Downing,
Chapple, and McDonald, the court ruled that expert
testimony concerning the factors that may impair the
accuracy of a typical eyewitness identification is admissible under Ohio Evidence Rule 702. The court, nevertheless, limited its decision in one important respect.
According to the court, expert testimony concerning the
credibility of the identification testimony of a particular
witness is inadmissible "absent a showing that the
witness suffers from a mental or physical impairment
which would affect the witness' ability to observe or recall
events." /d. at 133, 489 N.E.2d at 804.
For other state cases accepting such testimony, see
People v. Brooks, 128 Misc. 2d 608, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692
(Westchester Cty. Ct. 1985); State v. Moon, 40 Grim. L.

United States v. Downing
The leading federal case recognizing the usefulness of
expert testimony is United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d

5

Rptr. (BNA) 21-22 (Wash. Ct. App, Oct. 20, 1986); An not.,
46 A.L.R.4th 1047 (1986).

E-yewitness Behavior: Is It Safe. and Effective?, in Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives 283 (G.
Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984).

Research
REFERENCES

Most of the researchers who have studied this issue
believe that expert testimony would assist jurors in evaluating eyewitness testimony. For example, one recent
study concluded that "the present data refute the claim
that expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identifications would not tell the jury members anything they
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